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Causality in External Sensation

Accordin~

Chapter

INTRODUCTION
The problem of causality in external sensation has been one that
has caused philosophers much

~fficulty

since it involves the knotty

problem of the interaction of matter and spirit.

Obviously, it •ould

seem, no mtre material body can cause a change in a simple spiritual
entity like

Dl8l'l'

s soul.

Yet the psychic state that is an essential

part of sensation seems to be an affection ot such a simple soul, and

likewise seems to be caused by the material objects around man.

This

problem has been aggravated for those philosophers who emphasize the
dualim of matter and spirit, and, fearful lest they confuse the t•o
in man, so widen the gap bet•een body and soul that they insulate the

soul completely from the causal influx of the body.
It is the purpose of the present paper to show the solution which
one thinker, St. Albert the Great, proposed to solve the problem of
causality in sensation.

From an investigation of St • .Albert• s writings

•e shall describe his theory of causality in external sensation and attempt to determine how successfully his explanation solved the basic
problems of this causality.
The order of procedure w:lll be simple.

We shall begin with a

brief sketch ot the history of causality in sensation from Plato and
Aristotle to st. Albert.

This nll comprise the first chapter.

The

second chapter will contain a short delineation of the notions basic
to st. Albert's explanation and a S\1DIIII8.rf of some important terminology.
1

2

The third chapter, which is the heart of the thesis, will contain an
exposition of Albert's explanation of sensation and show what he contributed to the scholastic theory as he found it.

'!he four'tltand last

chapter will comprise a critical evaluation of St. Albert's explanation
in the light of the complete and scholastic theory, especially as pro-

posed by his famous pupil, Thomas J.quinas.

With such an exemi nation we

shall have completed our attempt to solve the fundamental problem of this
thesisa

What. was the specific contribution of st. Albert the Great to

the scholastic doctrine of causality in external sensation.

HISTORY OF THB: QUESTION

It was Plato who advanced the first theory of sensation that was
of major importance. He saw the real nature of sensatiOD and set out
to explain its workings. According to Plutarch, Plato characterized
sensation as "a communion of soul and body in relation to external objects.•l In the Philebus Plato gives a description of sensation wbieh,
understood correctly, could almost be used by a scholastic philosopher.
He sayss2
Suppose some of the affections which are
in the body from moment to moment exhaust
themselves in the body alone, before---or
without---reaching the soul, thus leaving
the latter unaffected; While others pass
through both aid impress on both a sort
of tremor of quite a peculiar kind, in
which both body and soul participate. •••
When both body and soul in this way partake of the co11111on affection, and ar6
moved by this cODJDlOil movement, i f you
call this sensation, you would speak
quite correctly.
But while we can accept Plato's description we cannot accept it
as he meant it.

For Plato's cosmology could never be a basis for a

scholastic theory of cognition, since the author of the dialogues did
not give the same objective existence to the external material world
J. Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition !!:!!! Alcmaeon !,2
Aristotle, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1906, 210. Beare quotes froa
Plut., Epit., iv, 8; Diels, »ox., 344.
2 ~·f cf. Philebus, 33d-34a

1

3

that we do.

The sensible world was for him variously participation,

4

community, and imitation of the only reality, the ideas.3 The sensible objects are between the reality of the forms and the nothingness
of not-being. They are a sort of becoming or motion. 4 What is more,
the sensible objects exist only when they are being sensed. Plato
states this very clearly in the Theaetetus& 5
And yet, when I become percipient, I must
necessarily become percipient of something,
!or it is impossible to become percipient
and perceive nothing; and that which is
perceived must become so to someone, when
it becomes sweet or bitter or the like; for
to become sweet, but sweet to no one is impossible.... The result, then is that we
are bound to one another; and so if a man
says anything "is", he must say it is to
or of or in relation to something •••
This emphasis on the relativism of sensation led Plato to a subjectiTism that vitiated his doctrine of sensation. Plato found himself
trimming down the reality of the external world, until in the Republic
he made sensible objects shadGws of images of men, animals, and other
things---shadows twice removed from reality. 6
3 cf. A. E. Taylor, Plato--The I!!! !!!! !!!!. !2£!, Dial Press, New York,
1936, 188; also Phaedo lOOd, "I hold that nothing else makes it
beautiful but the presence or communion ••• of absolute Jaeauty."
(trans. by H. N. Fowler in Loeb C1assica1 Library, Wm. Heinemann,
London, 1925, I, 345); alae Parmenides, l32d, "I think that the most
likely view is, that these ideas exist in nature as patterns and
that other things resemble them and are imitations of them; their
participation in ideas is assimilation to them, that and nothing
else." (trans. by H. N. Fowler in Loeb Classical Libra.ry, Wm.
Heinemann, London, ~928, VI, 219-221)
4 J. Burnet, Greek PhilosGpby, Part ! Thales to Plato, Jlacmillan, London,
1924, 240J cf. Theaetetus, l56d-l57a
5 Theaetetus, Sophist, trans. by H. N. Fowler, HeiDemann, Lendon, 1928, 71
6 Republic, vii, 514d

5

Despite this theory of being, Plato's explanation of sensation had
many :Weights that, iD other hands, would lead to a fuller explanation
ef sensation.

Plato held five external senses which were exercised

through the instrumentality of sense organa'---an instrumentality that
is not explained.

He also postulated a common sense which was for him

an activity of the soul aJ.one.

8

Plato also decided that all the sensibles except those of sight
act directly on the sense organs.

In sight alone a medium is needed

because only in sight does the absence of a third thing---light--prevent senaation.

9

In hearing and the other senses the active

motion of the body and the passive motion of the sense interact
without rmy

o~aille

help.

In sight, however, light is needed for

sight takes place only When the fire streaming from the eye and the
fire which is the color of the object, (Ple.to held the four elements},
cooperate with the support and substantiation of the fire of daylight
in the air.lO

The causality involved in these operations is extremely obscure.
Sometime& it seems that the object and the sense, (in sight the medium,
7 Burnet, ~Philosophy, I, 246; cf. Theaetetus,l84c
8 ~., 247; cf. Theaetetus, 185b-o
9 Beare, 48; ct. Republic, vi, 507d, "Though vision may be in the eyes
and ita possessor may try to use it, and though colour be present,
yet without the presence of a third thing specifically and naturally
adapted to this purplae, you are a-.re that vision will see nothing
and the colours will remain invisible... The thing ••• you call light."
(trans. by P. Shorey in~ ClassicalLibrary, Wra. Beineaum, London,
1930, II, 99)
10 cf. Timaeus, 45b-46a (trans. by R. Bury in Loeb ClassicaJ. Library,
Wm. Heinemann, London, 1929, 101-103)

too), have efficient action.ll

At other times the passive motion

which Plato ascribes to the sense seems to be passive potency as
conceived by Aristotle. 12 Frankly it is impossible to decide precisely what causality each factor exercises.
Plate has given us notions that will lead to a fuller expl&.l'lation
of the sensitive process, but he himself has muddled the question
very badly. Had he followed out his metaphysical doctrine of subsilt.nt ideas he would have become an idealist and reJected sensation
entirely. However, he did not become an idealist and tried unsuccessfully to solve the puzzle of sensation.
The Platonic trend none the less was definitely towards idealism.
Whether this trend would have carried on to a fully developed idealism
is anybody' a guess._ In the actual course of events Aristotle came along
combining speculative genius with empirical hard-headedness. He de•
cided to base his philosophy on physical reality and not on abstract
idea.s. Plato had started with abstraction and succeeded in his attempt
to reach reality only at the expense of consistency. Aristotle would
take the opposite course and try to teach abstraction from reality.
11 ct. Timaeus, 44a, "And whenever external sensations in their movements collide with these revolutions and sweep along with them also
the whole vessel ot the Soul, t'hen the revolutions, though actually
mastered, seem to have mastery." (Loeb, 97)
12 ct. Theaetetus, 156a-156d, • ••• there are two kinds of motion ••• and
of these one has an active, the other a passive force. From the
union and friction of these twe are born ••• the object of sense and
the sense ••• tbe eye and some appropriate obJect beget whiteness and
the corresponding perception ••• " (Loeb, 67)

7
The physical world for the Stagirite was composed of universal natures
individualized and embodied in matter. 13 The universal, as universal,
exists only in the minda outside us are only singulars.
The bodies of this physical universe are composed of matter and
form, potential and actual principles.
actualized by the form.

Jratter is inert, a substratWD

Forms are substantial and accidental, giving

esse simpliciter and esse tale respectively. 14 It is the accidental
forma that are the proper object of sense cognitiOR.l 5 T.hesi qualities
are capable of an operation that impresses a lika111 of their forms

on the sinses designed to receive them. 16 This perception is called
the apprehension of forms without the matter, because, since the matter
of the object known is inert, it cannot activate a perception of itself
in the sense.l7
13 W.D.Ross, Aristotle, Methuen, London, 1937, 158; ct. MetAQhYsics,
VI, 16, 1040, b 27a "It is evident then that no universals exist
over and above the individual objects and separate from them."
(trans. in 0-.Bakewell, Source ~~Ancient PhilosophY, Scribners, New York, 1907, 224)
14 ~ •• 165-166
15 E.Zeller, Aristotle !!!!! lh! Barlier feripatetics, trans. by B.
Costelloe and J .Jmirhead, Longmans, London, 189'7, II, 60; also
W.HBJSond, Aristotle' 8 fSYchology, S11&ll, London, 1902, XXXV* cf •,
II De A!•• 418a, "To the objects of sense, strictly regarded, belong such properties as ari peculiarly and properly sense qualities,
and it is with these that the essential nature of each sense is
naturally concerned." (trans. in Hammond, 70)
16 Zeller, !.2g_. ill•J of. n DeAn., 424a, "In reference to sensation
in general we must understand that a sense is capable of receiving
into itself sensible forms without their matter, just as wax receives
into itself the mark o£ a ring without its iron or gold." (Hamrnond, 93)
17 ibid.

a
These forms, however, are not known apart from the conditions of
matter because sensation is an act of the composite subject of matter
and form, and not a spiritual activity of the soul alone.l8 The sentient
subject receives the form of the object into a corporeal organ, but
form does not have the same mode of existence in the sense that it did
in the object.l9
In Aristotle's explanation the object is the cause of sensation.

The sensible object causes a qualitative change in the

the sense,
having received this change, is said to have actual sensation. 20 This
•en••~

reception, however, is not a mere passive taking on of a new form; the
sense seems to have some kind of immanent operation.2l Aristotle is
not clear on this point, yet he does seem to have held the activity
of the sense that his scholastic followers professed. We are not told
the exact nature of this operation of the sense.
As we shall see later, Aristotle's explanation of sensation is
the scholastic explanation.

The scholastics filled in the details

and made distinctions that Aristotle may or -.y not have thought of.
Their doctrine is, in any event, the logical development of the Stagi-

J&. fsychophysiaue Hnmf4ipe, D' A,pres .Aristote, Alcan,
Paris, 1930, 94f cf. ! ~ AR·• 403a, "In·most casee the soul apparently neither acts.nor is acted upon independently of the body,
e.g. in the feelings of anger, courage, desire, or in a word, in
sense perception." (Hammond, 6)
19 ~., 107; cf. !! ~ A!•• 424a, "It (the organ of sense) has an
identity with the object that makes the impression, but in its
mode of expression it is different." (Hammond, 92)
20 Zeller, II, 60
21 ~., 59, n.3
18 P.Siwek, S.J.,

9

rite• s explanation.

.Aristqtle did most of the work, the scholastics

picked up Where he left off.
The next philosopher of name to come to grips with the problem
sensation was Piotinus.

(£

An investigation of sensation was a part of

his rehabilitation and development of Platonism.
ho'll8ver, to discover precisely what PlotiDus held.

It is no easy task,
He says that sensi-

ble reality is merely phenomenal, devoid of true reality. 2 2
he means· by this is not clear.

Just what

He seems to say that souls create

bodies for themselves and give them an "image of 16."23 U'berweg says
it is a reality at most analogous with the reality of the spiritual
world. 24
According to Plotinus the soul is in the body as a pilot in a ship
and so has its own activities, some apart from tne body and some in the
cf. bneads, I, a, 3, '13dJ Plotinus calls sensible reality nonbeing, explaining it, -By not-being I do not mean absolute non•
existence, but only What is different from real existence. Nor
do I mean not-being in the sense that motion and rest ••• are notbeing, but rather in the sense of an image of real existence or
of something which U.s even less existence than an image." (trans.
by Bakewell, .22• g.!!., 3'15} "What I am alluding to is the phenomenal
universe and all the affections of the sensible world." (Bakewell, 375}
23 ct. Knneade, Iv, 3, 10, "But soul by the power of essence has
dominion over bodies in such a way that they are generated and
subsist just as she leads them •••For that which it (soul} imparts
to body is an image of life." (trans. by T.t'tlylor in Sci ect 12£!!
of Plotinus, George Bell, London, 1895, 220}
·
24 F. Uberweg, Historx of Philosophy from Thales !.2 1!!!, Present ~'
trans. by G. Morris, Scribner's, New York, 1896, I, 70.
22

10
body. 25

Sensation is an activity of the soul in the body.26. Plotinus

does not mention the active and passive motion of Plato, rather he
speaks of the activity of the soul working through the instrumentality
27
of the body.
Nowhere does he allow any real causal influence to
the object in actual sensation.

There is a certain passivity of body28

but perception is an activity of the soul. 29

Clearly the causality

for Plotinus lies in the subject and not in the object.
After Plotinus St. Augustine came upon the philosophical scene to
build a Christian philosophy.
as much of the

Neo-~tonist

In his work the bishop of Hippo used

explanations as he could.

In fact he

used so much of their material, and especially their terminology,
that some critics haTe doubted whether he did more than put a Christian
veneer on a thoroughly pagan piece of philosophical furniture. 30 It is
now generally accepted, however, that st. Augustine reworked Neo-Platon•
25 ct. Enneads, IV, 3, 21, " ••• the soul is said to be in the body in
such a way as thepilot in a ship ..... (Tayler, 23'1) and " ••• there
is something of the soul in which the body is conts.ined, and also
something in which there is nothing of body; meaning by the latter
those powers of the soul of which the body is not indigent."
(Taylor, 238)
26 ~., " ••• the sensitive power is present in the whole of the
sentient organs." ( 'l'a.ylor, 238)
27 ibid., 23, ~or in order to effect this perception the whole body is
present as an instrument with the soul." ('l'a.ylor, 238)
28 ~., 26, " ••• the soul must receive the judgment arising from the
passion of the body." (Taylor, 243)
29 Plotinus speaks of the soul "directing its attention" (Enneads, IY,
3, 3; Taylor, 209) and of intellect "comprehending all things as
genus comprehends species." (Enneads, V, 11, 6; Tayler, 189)
30 K.P .Garvey, St. Augustine a Christian !!!: Heo-Plat onist 7, »arquette
University Press, Milwaukee, 1939, 3•14

ll
ism in a completely Christian spirit, retaining only so much of it as
fitted in with Christian teaching.3l
For Augustine sensation is a true knowledge of corporeal reality
at which we arrive through a process shared by both the soul and the
32
body.
Following Flotinus, Augustine makes the proper act of sensation, (the actual perception), an activity of the soul alone and gives
the body a merely passive role. 33

In this passive role the body ex-

ercises no causality on the soul but only receives images of external
objects which the soul then peroeives. 34 Augustine refused to allow
the body any causal action on the soul because he held it as fundamental that no lower nature could effect anything in a higher nat\lre.

35

st. Augustine gives a sketchy treatment of sensation that is the
31

ibid., 239-240

32

De Quantitate Animae, xxiii, 41, "Sensum puto esse non latere
animam quod patitur corpus;" and De Trinitate, IX, xii, 18,

"Liquido tenendum est quod omnis res quamcumque coilloscimus, congenerat in nobis notitiam sui. Ab utroque enim cognitio paritulP,
a cognoscente et cognito." (Cf. L. Keeler, S.J., Sancti Augustini
Doctriu de Cognitione, Apud Aedes Pont. Univ. Gregorianae, Rome,
1934, 18)
33 De JIU.sica, VI, iv, 7, " ••• quia et sentire et meminissi animae est,"
(Keeler, 19), and ibid., v, 9, "•• .videtur mihi anima, cum sentit
in oorpore, non ab ill,o aliquid pati, sed in ejusp.ssionibus attentius agere." (Keeler, 20)
34 ~ Trinitate, XI, 2, "Ideoque non possumus quidem dicere quod sensum gignat res visibilis; gignit tamen formam velut similitudinem
suam, quae fit in sensu, cum aliquid videndo sentimus." ~ uoted
in Knapke, The Scholastic Theory £! !h!_Species Sensibilia, Oath.
Univ. Press, Washington, 1915, 20)
35 DeGen. ad Lit., XII, xvi, 33, "Nee sane putandum est facere aliquid
in spiritu, tanquam spiritus corpori facienti materiae vice
subdatur." (Keeler, 19)

corp;.
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less satisfying since it contains a number of Aristotelian ideas that
fit but poorly into the Platonic structure of the explanation.

He tried

to follow Aristotle on some points, but once he denied that the object
had actual efficient action in the production of sense knowledge, he
cut himself off from the fpllowers of Aristotle.

Without that basic

tenet no explanation of sense cognition can be truly Aristotelian.
'fhe Greek theory of sensation was transmitted to the medieval
scholastics by Arabian philosophers as well as by St. Augustine.

These

eastern thinkers bad contact with Aristotle through Syriac and Arabian
translations and with Plato through Plotinus and his oriental satellites.
Their psychology was further influenced by the physiological findings
of the Arabian physicians.
J.vicenna, subject to all three of the6e influences, expounded
a philosophy of sensation that was an unusual mixture of Plato, Aristotle
and Arabian physiology.

He holds, for instance, the extreme dualism of

body and soul common to Platonists,36 and at the same time defends such
typically Aristotelian notions as that matter is the principle of individuation and that all knowledge of external reality must come through
the senses. 37
Although Avicenna admits that all knowledge depends on sense
knowledge, his neo•platonic leanings force him to refuse true efficient
16 T.J.DeBoer, The History of Philosophy in Islam, trans. by E. Jones,
Luzac and Co;;-London, 1'§!3, 139
-37 J • Ledvina, A Philosophy !:!'!!! Psychology ~ Sensation, Cath. Univ.
Press, wa~ngton, 1941, 18•19
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causality to the objects of sense in actual sensation.38 The forces of
nature~ it is true, can cause qualitative change in the organs of sense.39

This physical change Avicenna explains after the manner of Aristotelian
reception of

fo~,

but with this important differencea the form is re-

ceived in concreto, with its matter and not, according to the true interpretation of Aristotle's teaching, without the matter but under the
conditions of matter. 40
Avicenna speaks of sensible forms, the TJTTOf of .Aristotle but
explains them as physical accidents of the organ of sense.

Thus in

sight, for example, the eye takes on accidents of color, size and appearance of the objects seen.4l These for.ms are diminutives of the
object, that is they have the same figure and quality as the object
but are reduced to fit into the optic nerve (in sigbt) or the other
nerves of the various sense organs.

Since the mutation caused by the

reception of these forms is on the purely physical plane it cannot, according to Avicenna, be the cause of a psychic state. For that an immaterial agent is needed; Avicenna delegates this power to the soul
which is, then, the true efficient cause of the actual sensation.

42

To show the influence of the Arabians on scholastic philosophers
38 Knapke, .21?.• cit., 42
DeBoer, m• 9:1., 140
Knapke, 21!• ill•, 39
41 ibid•
42 ibid., 42
39
40
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it will be worth while to insert here a sketch of the explanation of
sensation given by John de la Rochelle.

Rochelle was one of the many

scholastics who attached considerable importance to the physiology of
sensation.

In his

!!!!!!!!!!

~~he

explains the need for media and

tells us exactly how thesenses operate. 43 In his discussion of the
medium he makes it clear that the object really acts on the medium and
the medium causes a change in ihe sense. 44
It is obvious from this that Rochelle was acquainted with Aristotle's
position. Besides this he shows his knowledge of Aristotle's psychology
on many points. He gives,for example, an accurate account of the unity
of body and soul as matter aDd form of the same substance, man, 45 and
declares that the soul bas power to receive "species spirituales intelligibiliter" and "similitudines corporales sensibiliter".46 Again
of the powers of sensation he says, "!!£!!tam animae guam_ corporis
~

possunt, quia

pGesut.

47

y

~

in corpore fiunt !!!!.

~

All this is clearly peripatetic doctrine.

utroque .fieri
But with this

Summa de Apima, (ed.Domenichelli), Prato, 1882, 2571, "Necessarium
ergo fuit m~um in quolibet sensu." He explains vision,(ibid,
293), "Sensus enim visus recipit per actionem lucis speciem coloris ••• Sensus enim fit per receptionem specie1 similitudinis objecti
non per receptionem ipsius secundum essentiam."
44 !ill•, 255, "Sonus ••• immutat aerem medium imprimendo ei suam
speciem," and (ill!•, 257), "lledium immutatum immutat auditum."
45 ibid., 170, "Ex ani:aJa et corpore fit unum secundum substantiam,
quod est homo."
43

46
47

!ill·'
~.,

132
224
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he also presents St. Augustine's theory of vision with no sign of dieapproTal. 48
All in all John de la Rochelle gives us an unusual conglomeration
of Aristotelianiam and Augustinianism.

Just why he included such con-

tradictory explanations in the same work is not clear.

Knapke thinks

that he had too great a respect for authority and was unable to bring
himself to make a choice between the traditional Augustinian doctrine
and the tempting •xplanations of Aristotle newly received from the
Arabians. 49 Whatever the reason, his compromise is quite untenable§
he is left with both horns of the dilemma.
active.

Sensation is passive and

It is merely the reception of forms from outside and it is

the going forth and abstracting of these forms from the object of sense.
Surely here the last error is worst than the first, for in the final
analysis John de la Rochelle has no theory of sensation.
With this we complete our sketch of the history of causality in
sensation.

We have seen the two classic doctrines of the Greeks, those

of Plato and Aristotle, and we have seen the predominance of the former
in Plotinus and Augustine.

In

Avicenna. we saw the resurgence of Aris-

totle's theory, but even here the influence of Plato was too strong to
be overcome.

The result was that Avicenna held the basic Platonic

stand on causality in sensation although he used Aristotle's explanation of the workings of sensation.

In

John de la Rochelle we saw the

48 ill!•, 224; cf. Knapke, 76 and Jl. DeWulf, History of Medieval Philoso~' trans. by E. Messenger, Longmans, London, 1926, ~' 350
49 £2• ~- 79

~

----------------------------------------------------------------------~
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same conflict with John taking no conclusive stand.
We have come to the point in the history of the scholastig
~heory

of sensation when the stage was perfectly set for the complete

reinstatement of Aristotle's explanation of causality in sensation.
Up till this time scholastic philosophers had been trying to unite the

doctrines of Plato aDd Aristotle into one theory.

Now, however, they

-'re taling more and more of Aristotle and less of Plato.

Still they

were afraid to take over Aristotle's theory bodily.- They felt with
Plato that no mere sensible object with its form immersed in matter
could eause the psychic state that is senaaton.

Such a state is

part of the activity of immaterial being and the gap between matter
and spirit is too wide to be bridged by the activity of any material
form.

As time went on they had allowed greater activity to the object,

it is true, yet none could allow the object sufficient power to bridge
the gap between body and soul.

It was lett to Albert to re-establish

a psychology that could bridge the chasm.

The explanation of how he

did it will be the burden of the rest of this paper.

CHAPTER II
SOJdE BASIC NOTIONS AND IMPORTANT TEIU4INOLOGY
Before we enter into a discussion of St. Albert's theory of
causality in sense cognition, it will be profitable to study several
ideas basic to his solution.

It will be useful, too, to preface our

discussion of st. Albert's explanation with a clarification of the
terminology he uses when treating problems of sensation.

Such a study

will be doubly useful. First it will focus our attention on St.
Albert's contribution to the scientifically exact vocabulary of the
scpolastic explanation of sensation. And secondly it will allow us
to give a complete description of St. Albert's theory in the next
chapter without con&'tant backtracking to explain his terminology.
perhaps the most conspicuous advance in scholastic language due
to st. Albert •s his clarification of the meaning of the words
matter and

li!:!!' and potency and !.21• Albert •• one of the

first

scholastics to realize the true Aristotelian meaning of matter and
form when applied to body and soul. He was the first scholastic to
solve the problem posed by the peculiar nature of the human soul
which can live apart from the body after death.

'!'he Arabian Aristo-

telians and probably Aristotle hims,lf could not see how the soul as
form ot the body could continue in existence after its separation from
the body. Earlier scholastics knowing from faith that the soul did live
1'1
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after the death of the body could not see how it could be immersed in
matter as the form of the body.

Albert soh·ed the problem by attribut-

ing a kind of double nature to the soul.

It is the motor of the body,

and so it can exist apart from the body.

It is also the form of the

body and so gives life to the body.l He then explained how this can bea
The soul is not the motor corporis as a pilot is the navigator of a ship,
but it is a mover that is a perfection of the thing moved in the very
nature of that which is moved, 2 because body and soul are not two separate,
complete entites, as pilot and ship. Rather body and soul together form
3
a single hypodyis.
The soul can be called a substance only because
it is the substantial f~rm of the body.4
Once he accepted this correlation of matter and form for body and
soul, Albert could and did reject the "rider on the horse" theory spon-

s. de Creaturis II, t.l, q.4, a.2, ed. by A. Borgnet, Vives, Paris,
1898, XXXV, 39, • ••• anima est actus primus ••• qui dat esse et speciem
et rationem ei cujus est actus." Also, Summa Theologica II, t.12,
q. 69, m.2, a.2 ad 2 & 3 (Vives XXXIII, 16), "Ad aliud dicendum
quod animam considerando secundum se, consentiemus Platonia considerando autem eam secundum formam animationis quam dat corpori,
consentiemus Aristotelir ••• anima quae est t~tum actus corporis,
sicut vegetabilis iD p1antis, et sensibilia in brutis ••• non separantur a corpore."
2 s. Th. II, t. 13, q.77, m.l ad 5 (vives XXXIII, 70-71), " ••• dicen•
dum quod ex motore et mobi1i ubi motor non est perfectio mobilis
secundum esse naturae, sed ut nauta et navis se habent, et motor
coeli se habet, numquam fit unuma ex motore autem et mobili ubi mo~or
perfectie: est mobilis secundum esse naturale, semper fit unum constitutum ex utroque."
3 ibid., ad 4 (Vives XXXIII, 70), " ••• dicendum quod nee anima nee corpus-eat hypostasis perfeeta, sed homo constitutus ex anima et corpore."
4 s. Th. II, t.l2, q.69, m.l (Vives XXXIII, 8-9), "Anima enim substantiaest quia est substantialia forma animati."
1

l.9

sored by Platonists and Augustinians.

No longer was he faced with a

gap between body and soul that had to be bridged by some flimsy,
spirit-like matter.

Hatter and spirit are parts of the same substan-

tial unit.

There is no need for a medium between them.

affect part

simp~y

Part can

because both are parts and not separate substances

on different rungs of the ladder of being.
Albert further extended this fuller notion of matter and form to
the sense faculties and the sense organs.

The sense organ, according

to our Dominican master, is the sense organ precisely because it is
informed by the faculty. 5 Faculty and organ are, then, one unit.
Therefore they act as a unit with the result that any affection of
the organ ~ organ causes a change in the faculty. 6 The practical
conclusion st. Albert drew from this was that now the sense faculties
could have communication with their objects. 7 The object can stimulate
the sense organ since both are extended and material.

But since the

s. de ~· II, q.2, a.l ad 6 (Vives XXXV, 13), " ••• dieendum quod
in corpore organico nulla forma specifica est anta:~_aaimizD:It.._.Cuc;~enim
non est caro, nisi per hoc quod est medium in sensu tactus. Similiter nervus non est nervus, nisi per hoc quod est organum animae influentis per ipsum corpori sensum et motum ••• et sic de al1is membris
similibus et dissimilibus."
6 ~Sensu !1 Sensato, t.l, c.5 (Vives IX, 10), "(Aristotelis dicit)
visibile secundum esse spirituals et intentionale prius effici in
aere, post in oculo, et moveri speciem rei visae ad interius oculi,
ubi in humido crystalline est vis visiva ... " Also, ~ de Apprehensions I, 5 (Vives V, 557), "Non credas sensibilia in animam agere,
sed in organa corporwu quae quidem organa, quia animate. aunt, mot us
sensibilium usque ad animam provenit."
7 s. de Creat. II, q.34, a.3 ad 5 (Vives XXXV, 303), " ••• sensus est
susceptivum sensibilium specierum, hoc ipsum quod dico sensibilium
supponit objectum sensus secundum.actum, et hoc de ratione sui ponit
praesentiam materiae."
5
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stimulus affects the sense organ gua. sense organ it also affects the
sense faculty, by reason of the unity of matter and form.

With this

explanation st. Albert cut the Gordian knot th&t his predecessors h&d.
tried. vainly to loose.

They had labored at the futile task of trying

to discover a medium between body and soul, between the sense organ
and its faculty; he came along and showed that such a medium was not
necessary.
St. Albert likewise put stronger emphasis on the .Aristotelian
doctrine of act and. potency than had previous scholastic philosophers.
This notion, too, he applied to sense cognition. According to the dietrine of the Stagirite revived by St. Albert, the sense is a passive
potency, but .one that has an operation once it is reduced to act. 8
This reduction to actuality from potentiality is effected by sensible
objects mediately through the sense organ and the exterior and interior
mediums of ether, air, water and flesh. 9 This process is not the usual
physical change from black to white or hot to cold as many of the earlier
philosophers, especially the .Arabians, thougb.t.lO Rather it is a change
8 ibid., q.34, a.l (Vives XXXV, 295-296), " ••• sensus est potentia passiva
••• sed sensus completus per actum speciei sensitivae judicat et agit."
9 ibid., ad 3 (Vives XXXV, 296) ttSed faciens sensibilia in aotu colore&
sensibiles, et motus fractivus aeris facit actu sonos et vaporativum
in mia.to odorifero facit actu od.o:res, h1.1Idi.dum autem 'tcundum actum
penetrativum est ad nervum gustat1vum, eT lingua fac1 actu saporesa
qualitates autem tactus per seipsas agunt in tactum. Et propter hoc
activum sensuum non potest esse in potentiis animae."
.
10 ibid., corp. (Vives XXXV, 295), "Sensus dicit~ potent~ pass1va non
quod recipiat formam quae transmutat substant1~ suam ~n substanti~
secundum esse, sed potius transmutatur in spec1em sens1bilem secun
dum intentionea."
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from privation to habit. 11 By this he means that the sense receives a
form not in place of a previous form as when a colored object receives
a new color, but acquires a form where before it had no for.m.

With

this new form it is then reduced from a state of potency to one of
actuality, from potential sensation to actual sensation.

In this new

condition it has its proper operation---here the judicium sensus, the
consciousness of the object. 12 Since the sense receives this form by
being acted upon by the object of sense, Albert says that sensation is
primarily a passio, and that the faculty is primarily passive. Here
again, however, we must distinguish between a proper passion, as the
change from white to black and the passion in sensation which is, as
we said above, a change from privation to habit.l3
Another point on which St. Albert adds much to the explanations
of earlier scholastics is his distinction of the form in sensation
according to its threefold existence, in the object, in the medium,
and in the sense.

A confusion of thase three stages had made it al-

most impossible for scholastic philosophers before Albert to solve the
problems of sensation.

These earlier thinkers seemed to believe that

the form of the object existed physically in the medium and in the sense
as well as in the object.

Obviously this created difficulties.

The

prime objection to such an explanation was that it madi the sense organ
the object of sense since, according to this, the form of color in sight
ll

ibid., q.2l, a.5 ad 105 (Vives XXXV, 210), " ••• alteratio vero sen~ est de privatione in habitum."
12 cf. supra p.20 n.a
13 cf. supra P• 20 n.ll
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would be in the eye as an accident of the eye.

If this caused sensa-

tion, it •hould be the object of sensation, for it is the first formal,
physically existing color with which sight comes in contact.
not at all clear how it could be otherwise.

It is

A colored thing, here tl:a

eye, could hardly be the medium to another colored thing, the external
object.

If anything, it should obstruct the vision of other colored

thi.ngs.l4
Albert avoided this difficulty by following Aristotle in giving
the form a triple existence---in the object, in the medium and in the
sense.

It is in the object materialiter, that is, as physically in-

forming the matter of the object.l5 Thus, for instance, the color of
a wall is in the wall materialiter---the wall is formally colored; it
has all the concomitant effects of coloredness, i.e. it ean be seen,
it can reflect light, and so forth.

The sensible form is in the medium

according to a second mode of existence, which st. Albert calls
biliter.16

~

In his use of this term our author wishes to point out

that the form is passing from the object to the sense; there to cause
14 §._Ih. II, t.ll, q.51, m.l (Vives XXXII, 537), "it ex hoc procedit
Avicenna, quod si lux est corpus, vel defluxus corporisa aut illud
corpus est luminosum, aut pervium••• Si aut em sunt luminosa corpora
illaa tunc quanto magis densantur, tanto magis impediunt visUm ••• eo
quod tegunt omnia quae sunt post ipsa." Of. A. Schneider, Die f!lchologie Alberts des Grossen, in Beitrage die Geschicte ~ Philoso:Ehie, Munster, 1903, 101
15 s. de Creat. II, q.34, a.2 ad quaest. (Vives XXXV, 300), • ••• di;endum quid in veritate in tribus sensibus qui sunt per medium extrinsecum sensibile aliud habet esse in objecto, et in medio, et
in sensu.' In objecto enim habet ess! materialea. ~ se~su autem
habet esse spiritual& tantuma in med1o vero sens1b11e.
16 ibid.

-
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cognition, and does not make the medium colored.

If it did, it would

block vision rather than help it, as we noted earlier.

The form is,

then, transmitted along the medium without becoming a physical accident
of the medium. 17 The sensible form has its third mode of being in the
sense proper.

There, according to Albert, it exists spiritualiter or

intentionaliter, by which he means that the sense has in itself a representation or.species of the objeet.lB Thus in sight the eye is not
physically colored but is assimilated to the object through a represen19 Th'
20
. call ed th e spec1es
.
.
t at 1on.
1s represent a t'1on 1•t self 1s
sens ib'l'
1 1s.
Albert also notes this distinction of materialiter, sensibiliter,
and spiritualiter to show he realized the triple stage of the form in
sensation, but he himself seldom bothers to be exact in his own use of
17

~.,

" ••• aer habens colorem ut medium non agit actione materiae
secundum colorema quia nihil colorat." Also §.• de Creat. II, q.2l,
a.S (Vives XXXV, 209), "Dico aptitudinem recipiendi (formas) ut
deferens recipit et non ut recipit tenens. Et hoc est quod volunt
quidam dicere, quod visibilia sunt in medio ut in potentia motus
et non ut in termino et actu."
18 §.• ~ Creat. II, q.45, a.2 (Vives XXXV, 414), "Sensus in actu est
species sensibiliuma et haec taman species nihil est de esse material!
et naturali rei sensibilis, sed est similitudo illius generata ab
illa, et per similitudinem quam habet cum re sensata ducit in illam."
Also, II~ An., t.4, c.l (Vives v, 293), " ••• sensus accipit uniuscujusque sensibilis speciem••• non in quantum unaquaeque sensibilium
est unumquodque sensibilium secundum esse materiale sed in quantum
unumquodque illorum est in esse intentionali et secundum rationem."
Cf. ~ p.22, n.l5
19 s. de Creat. II, q.2l, a.s (Vives XXXV, 210), " ••• oculus habet speciem
visibilem ut habitum vel dispositionem, quae est principium cognoscendi rem vi sam."
20 ct. supra note 18
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the latter two.

Frequently be uses spiritualiter and sensibiliter in-

terchangeably. 21

In the same way he notes that the form is really and

t~uly

only in the object; in the medium and in the sense there is only

a species or similitudo, yet these three, too, he uses indiscriminately.
This finishes our chapter on the more important advances in idea
and terminology made by st. Albert.

With clear notions of these terms

and concepts we can now proceed to Albert's explanation of causality in
sensation and attempt to determine what contribution he gave to the
scholastic theory on this point.
21

cf. Schneider, 90; also II De An., t.3, c.6 (Vives V, 242), "Et non
unius rationis est esse quod habent in ipso medio, quia spiritualius
esse est coloris in medio ~uam sonia et iterum spiritualius esse
est soni in medio quam odoris."

CHIPTER THREE
CAUSALITY IN EXTERNAL SENSATION
ACCORDING TO .ALBERT
In

the previous chapter we have noted that st. Albert advanced

the scholastic theory of sensation with certain clarifications of
thought and expression.

We showed there that he re-established the

Aristotelian concepts of act and potency, matter and form, and the
passive nature of sensation.

It would be a mistake, however, to

think that St. Albert was completely free from the influence of st.
Augustine and the Platonist scholastics who followed him.

In Albert's

writings there are many vestiges of Augustine's thought •. These are,
as a matter of fact, so numerous that many present-day writers, following Schneider, have declared that Albert merely juxtaposed the doctrines ot' Aristotle, Augustine and the earlier scholastics without
making any attempt to weld them into a unified whole.

Schneider in

the first modern study of Albert's psychology states that it was a mere
hodge-podge of Augustine, the Fathers, Plat~ and Aristotle.l This
theory has been sponsored by such men as DeWulf 2 and Brett 3, more, it
would seem, on Schneider's word than on any independent investigation
l Schneider, 4-5
2 DeWu~f, I, 397, 401
3 G. Brett• ~ History of Psychology, Allen & Unwin, London, 1921, II,
108
25
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More recently, however, two Dominicans, Wilms4 in Ger5
many, and Reilly at the Catholic University of America, have made
of their ow.n.

new investigations and have decided that Schneider greatly exaggerated
the heterogeneous composition of Albert's philosophy.

These authors

have pointed out that in some instances Schneider failed to distinguish
Albert's explanations of the theories of other philosophers from his
criticism of them.

Albert's procedure, they tell us, varies with the

type of work that engaged his attention. Unlike St. Thomas, Albert
merely paraphrased the doctrines of the authors on whose works he
commented.

In all his remarks in these works he takes the viewpoint

of the authors in question.6 In his commentary on the Politics of
Aristotle he states explicitly that his only purpose in writing such
commentaries is to outline the theories of these earlier philosophers
without committing himself to a defense of their positions.

He states

this quite vigorously7a
Non ego dixi aliquid in isto libro, nisi exponendo quae dicta sunt, et rationes et causae
adhibendo. Sicut enim in omnibus libris physicis, numquam de meo dixi aliquid, sed opiniones.
Peripateticorum quanto fidelius potui, exposui.
Et hoc dico propter quosdam inertes, qui solatius suae in..rtiae quaerentes, nihil quaerunt
in scriptis nisi quod reprehendant; et cum tales
sunt torpentes in inertia, ne soli torpentes
videantur, quaerunt ponere maculam in electis.
Tales Socratem occiderunt. Platonem de Athenis
4 R. Wilms, Albert the Great, trans. by A. English, Burns Oates and
Washbourne, London, 1933, 82
5 G. Reilly, !h!, Psychology of St. Albert i!'!! Great, Oath. Univ. Press,
Washington, 1934, 54
6 ibid., 55
7 Jn VIII Politica, note ad fin. (Vives VIII, 803-804)
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in Academiam f'ugaverunt, in Aristotelem
machinantes etiam eum exira compulerunt •••
In some commentaries, however, as in his Delntellectu.!! Intelligibili, St. Albert included doctrines or Plato which he thou~ did not
contradict Aristotle's opinions. 8 Sometimes these doctrines are not
as consonant with peripatetic philosophy as Albert seemed to believe
9
and so we have a juxtaposition of' explanations mutually exclusive.
Wilms seeks to lessen the blame f'or this by emphasizing Albert's desire to get the whole truth and his consequent reluctance to reject
anything which might in some way complement the Aristotelian explana10
.
t 10De

As a result Albert's works do include strong traces of' Platonic
and Augustinian influence.

The authority of' the bishop of' Hippo and

Plato forced Albert to weigh their opinions carefully.

In doing this

he aeeepted some and "interpreted" others in such a way as to bring
them into agreement with those of Aristotle. 11 At other times instead
12
of r•conciling the two he merely juxtaposed conflicting explanations.

8 Deintellectu!! Intelligibili, c.l {Vives IX, 478), ttQuaecumque vero
hie inquirenda esse videntur quantum per demonstrationem et rationem
investigare poterimus, tractabimus sequentes principis nostri vestigia
••• Interdum etiam Platonis recordabimur in his in quibus Perpateticorum sententiis in nullo contradicit." This work was written by
Albert to f'ill a supposed gap in the works of Aristotle. As such
it is a commentary on a work that was never written. Albert took
the doctrines in it f'rom Aristotle's other works.
9 Reilly, 55
10 Wilms, 82
11

~.,

70

12 Reilly, 55

,...
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Since it is not within the scope of this paper to give a complete
study of st. Albert's philosophy, we need not concern ourselves with
the success or failure of Albert's general synthesis of philosophy.
Still we must note two points and decide whether Albert followed Aristotle or Augustine and Plato in his explanation of them, for they are
key doctrines in the explanation of causality in sensation.
We showed in the last chapter that .Albert held the Aristotelian
theory of matter and form as applied to soul and body. Aristotle,
however, was not clear on personal immortality, and many thinkers
could not see how in his system the form of the body could .exist apl:il't
from the body.

Similarly they failed to see how a purely spiritual

process such as intellection could be performed by a soul that was
the form of a material body. And the soul must be the form of the
body for the followers of Aristotle.

The objectors proclaimed that a

form thus "immersed in matter" could have no purely spiritual activity
and so could have no reason for being immortal.

To meet this dilemma.

Albert said that the soul was more than just the form of the body; it
was, as Plato said, the ~ corporis,. and as such had a certain reality
in itself •13 Perhaps this was not the clearest way to explain the
peculiar nature of the human soul, but the idea Albert wanted to convey
with this expression was certainly a legitimate extension of the Aristotelian position.
13

Albert retained the basic notion that the soul was

s. Th. II, q.69, m.2, a.2 sol. (Vives XXXIII, 16), " ••• ita ~ima duplicem debet habere definitioneml unum quod operatur vit~e 1n corBore
et in or~s ejus ••• alia definitio est quae aatur de ~ secun.um
se •••maxime secundum quam partem opera vitae operatur 1n seipsa;
cf. Wilms, 70
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the

£o~

o£ the body while adding the equally essential idea that the

soul does not exhaust its complete reality in this information.
This is o£ some importance to us because the soul must be the
form o£ the body i£ we are to have the interaction o£ the two necessary
1or the Aristotelian explanation o£ sensation.

I£ Albert had taken

over the complete Platonic notion o£ soul he would have had to £ace
the same problem that puzzled his predecessorsa the problem o£ the
causality o£ matter

on~irit.

This would have been a difficulty £or

him, because then he would have had the same gap between body and soul
that is postulated by every Platonic explanation.

Following Aristotle,

St. Albert could use the substantial union o£ body and soul as matter
and form to close the chasm that others had to bridge.
A aecond instance o£ St. Albert's use o£ Augustinia.u language
that we JDUet consider is that o£ his adoption o£ a "medium" between
body and 8oul. At first sight this would seem to show that Albert
did £eel that there was a gap between body and soul that he had to
bridge in some way.

Closer inspection, however, shows us that Albert's

"medium" between the two is in some instances a quality o£ the nerve
fibers and in others something roughly corresponding to the hormones
o£ the endocrine glands o£ modern biology.

The truth o£ this interpre-

tation is manifest £rom the numerous places Where St. Albert says that
this "medium" is a spiritus, and that the spiritus is something very
14 2• de ~· II, ~.78, (Vives XXXV, 637)
15 ~· Theol. II, q.7, m.2 (Vives XXXIII, 73)
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definitely corporeal.

In his own wordul4

"Generals. medium

ill spiritus

qui secundum medicos est medium inter aerem et ignem••• " And again in
15
sensationa
" .. ·~ ~ intelligi !! spiritu gui sit spiritualis
substantia

anima vel parte eius,

~

!!! spiritu quiHdpfert .forma.s

&£ organi! sensuum ad animam, guem probat Avicenna !!!!

sensibles
pore:;:J.

n

~-

\Vha.t is more, this medium does not exist to unite the soul and

body, but only to mediate the activity of the. soul throughout the body.l6
So it would seem that Albert is dealing with the physiology of the body
and showing how many of its activities are not regulated directly by the
soul, but rather through the activity of nerve& and hormones, as we would
say today.

This is confirmed by the phrase "according to the physician"

with which Albert explains the nature of the general medium of the soul's
operations in the body.l 7

Really, then, St. Albert has transformed the

medium as known to Augustine and earlier scholastics and has reduced it
to a merely physiological factor in the vital operations of the human
composite.

As such it fits in perfectly with the Aristotelian explana-

tion of the body-soul relationship.

18

We have tried to clarify the problem of a medium between body and
soul, because it reflects on the problem of the union between the two.
If Albert admitted a medium in the Augustinian sense, he would have
shown that he did not understand his own doctrine of matter and form,
and be would once more have been faced with a gap between body and soul--16

!•

~

Creat. II, q. 78 (Vives XXXV, 637), "anima sine medio est in
corpore sed non sine medio operatur."
17 !2![., cf. p.28 note 13
18 Reilly, 18
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the recurrent Platonic problem.
It has been necessary to dwell on these fundamental issues for with
false explanations of these one could give what would seem to be a completely Aristotelian explanation of the mechanics of the sensitive process and still not admit the basic Aristotelian notion of thecontinuity
of the causality from object to sense faculty.

Whether Albert did

follow out the Aristotelian explanation we shall see in a moment.

We

have seen already that, if nothing more, he had the necessary foundation
for the correct answer in the Aristotelian substantial union of body
and soul as matter and for.m.

We insist the more on this because cer-

tain Arabs seemed to have followed Aristotle, yet they could never
realize the import of the substantial union of body and soul.

The re-

sult was ever the same, they al.•ys left a gap to be bridged, and in
every case they failed to span it.

So, instead of postulating inter-

causality of body and soul, they made the bodily changes the occaaon
of sense cognition, never its cause.
As a matter of fact, however, Albert did follow Aristotle in his
whole theory of sensation.

Schneider notes that our saint used scien-

tific discoveries of the Arabians, but that he followed Aristotle most
closely just. on thos points where the Arabians departed from the Stagirite's doctrine. 19 A description of st. Albert's theory of sensation

19 Schneider, 88
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will show the truth of this remark.
The object of sense according to St. Albert is the sensible thing
existing outside the sentient subject. 20 Thus, the object of sight is
the colored thing really existing in the external world.21

So, too,

the other senses have external objectsa sound for hearing, odors for
smell, savors for taste, and tangible qualities for touch. 22 Albert
had no time for philosophies that spoke of material reality as a world
of shadows and faint representations of a higher, truer reality. 23
And not only did the objects of sense exist outside the subject of
sensation, but they were of themselves capable of causing a knowledge
of themselves in animals and men. 24 They took an active part in sensation, generating species in the

and so causing
25
They are not in any way acted upon by the sense.
sen~e,

percep~n.

20 ! de An., t.2, c.8 {Vives v, 164), "Sensus qui est motus sensibilium specierum est pertingens ab exterioribus usque ad anh~~am."
Also~· de Creat. II, q.34, a.l ad 3 {Vives XXXV, 296), " ••• actus
sensuum non poteet esse in potentia animae."
21 II~ An., t.3, c.'T (Vives v, 245), " ••• objectum cujus dicitur esse
visus ut propria causa inferens sibi passionem, ••• dicitur visibile;
naibile, aute:m.
color."
22 For hearing, ~· de Creat. II, q.24, a.l (Vives XXXV, 233), "sonus •••
dicitur qualitas sensibilis sensus auditus." For smell, ~., q.
31 (Vives XXIV, 271), "Cum objectum (olfactus) sit unum, scilicet
odor, unius rationis erit olfactus." For taste a ibid. II, q.32,
a. 2 {Vives XXXV 274), " ••• gustus ••• est judicium saporum.'' J'Dr
toucha ~· II, q.33, a.l {Vives XXXV, 282), " ••• tactus est •••
tangibilium judicium."
23 cf. Wilms, 72
24 2• de Creat. II, q.22 ad 8 (Vives XXXV, 225), " •••motus immutationis
est motus eorum (colorum) quo generant se primo in medio et postea
in oculo."
25 ibid. II, q.45, a.4 {Vives :XXXV, 417), " ••• organa sensuum tantum pati
in sentiendo et nihil agere nisi per accidens." Cf. supra p.20
n.9

••t
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Sensible objects, however, except those of touch, act in conjunction with certain dispositions of their media in this process of caus26
ing sensation.
Thus color and light unite to cause vision in the
eye, sound and a certain motion of the air, to cause hearing, and so
forth.

Albert calls this union of light and color a union "as of matter

and form." 27 For, he tells us, color exists materially in the object
until acted upon by light; then it has formal existence as color. 28
In this he claims to follow Aristotle who makes "Color secundum actum

·lucidi" 29 the object of sight.

Albert concludes from this that light

makes color visible because "actus lucidi

~

est, et hanc neguaguam

diceret .!!!! coloris naturam, ~ aiiguo ~ daret. ei .!!!.!!. et speciem"~ 30
The object, onct

~ated

by this necessary disposition of the medium
generates a representation of itself in the medium and the sense. 31

As we noted above, St. Albert includes all the senses except touch in
this explanation.
26

Tangible qualities, the object of touch, act of

ibid. II, q.34, a.l ad 3 (Vives XXXV, 296), "Sed faciens sensibilia
in actu in rebus est, sicut lux facit actu colores sensibiles, et
motus fractivus aeris facit actu sonos, et calidum vaporativum in

mixto odorifero facit actu odores, humidum autem secundum actum
penet~ativum est ad nervum gustativum, et lingua facit actu saporesa
qualitates autem tact us per seipsas a.gunt in tactum."
27 ibid. II, q. 21, a.3 (Vives XXXV, 200), " ••• color enim secundum
actum cum lumine quo agit unum visibile esta sicut materia et forma
non faciunt duo, sed unuma et ideo cum lumen illud sit ut forma,
color autem ut materia, erit ex illis duobus unum visibile secundum actum."
28 ibid. II, q.21, a.l (Vives XXXV, 188), "Color habet duplex esse,
scilicet materiale •• et esse formals secundum quod ipse movet sensum •••• Color est visibilis non omni modo, sed in ratione formali,
hoc est per actum luminis, qui dat ei actum et speciem secundum
quod poteet agere in visum."
29 ibid.
30 ibid., (Vives XXXV, 189)
31 cf. p.23 n.l8

34
themselves on their proper sense organ, the flesh. 32
St. Albert noted the obvious fact that sensibile objects are not
always in contact with-the sentient subject.

The colored object may

be yards from the eye that sees it; the sound of a bell may be heard
for miles.

Odors, too, may float in from a distance.

Albert, treated the question of media quite thoroughly.
divided them into two classes, exterior and interior.

Noting this,
First he
Exterior madia

are air and water; interior media are flesh and what he called "humidum
aqueum". 33 In sight air and water convey the sensible from the object to
34
the eye.
They are not, however, media by virtue of their own natures
but only insofar as they share in the diaphanous quality of light, a
participation of the famous "fifth essence". 35 Air and water are also
media for sound. 36 Air, besides being the medium for sound, is also.
the subject in which it exists. 37

Sound, according to Albert, is "a

sensible quality arising from the breaking movement of air, t..nd existing
32 2• ~ Oreat. II, q.33 a.3 (Vives XXXV, 290), " ••• tactus pertingit
ad partes carnis et cutis."
33 ibid. II, q.21, a.S (Vives XXXV, 204), "(in visu) aer et aqua sunt
medium;" ill!!• q.25 (Vives XXXV, 253), "Sonus duplex habet medium
scilicet aerem et aquam;" ibid., q.30 (Vives XXXV, 270), "Odor
est in aqua et in aere ut in medio;" ibid., q.32 a.4 (Vives XXXV,
280), "lledium in gustu est humidum aqueum;" ~., q.33, a.3 (Vives
.XXXV, 290), " ••• caro quamdam rationem habet medii."
34 Cf. note 33
35 s. de Creat. II, q.21, a.5 (Vives XXV, 204-205), "Aer et 1~qua sunt
;ed~~n secundum quod aer et aqua ••• (~ed ex) nat~a n qua
communicant aer et aqua cum perpetuo super1us corpore.
36 c!. note 33
252) "Aer enim est medium et
•
3'1 s. de Creat. II, q.36 (Vives XXXV, sine quo non est 8JUS
esse.
iateri;-rn-quo generatur sonus, et

•

Aqua vero est medium tantum."

35
with that movement.•

38

Once the movement atope, sound stops. 39

Odors, like color, are qualities of external bodies.4° They too
have air and water for media in which like color they do not exist
formally.

41

Taste and touch are sensed through internal media, in
42
taste the humidum agueum, and in touch the flesh.
The sensibles of
taste and touch are in the media in the double sense in Which sound is
in air, that is as in their natural subjects and as in the

medium~

medium. 43
Thus, for all the senses there are media and for all the senses
there are the species existing in the media. 44 This is what .llbert
means when he says that the sensibles are in the medium qua medium.
Strictly speaking, this would not be necessary, since there is no
reason why the quality physically existing in the medium could not
cause its representation directly in the organ.

Nonetheless Albert

folloWE Aristotle and the physiologists in positing the existence of
the species in the medium. 45

38 ibid. II, q.24, a.l (Vives XXXV, 233), "Dicimus ergo, quod sonus
est qualitas sensibilia, proveniens ex fractions aeris, et ens
cum illo."
39 ibid., " ••• sonus non habet esse nisi qua.mdiu durat motus ille."
40 ibid. II, q.26, a.s (Vives XXXV, 265), "Dicimus ••• quod sapor et
odor sunt sequelae complexionum corporum odorantium."
41 ibid. II, q.30 (Vives XXXV, 270), "Od()r est in aere et aqua ut in
medio
42 cf. supra P• 34 n. 33
43 s. de Creat. II, q.32, a.4 (Vives XXXV, 280), "•• .(humidum aqueum)
;st'"iedium et materiae et non medium tantum;" ibid. II, q.34, a.2
(Vives XXXV, 301), "Duo autem sensus qui sunt per medium intra,
habent sensibilia quae actu sunt ••• in medio."
44 II~ An., t.4, c.4 (Vives v, 297), " ••• sed tamen medium non agit
in organum nisi esse intentionale."
45 ~·

;
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St. Albert makes clear that the sense receives the sensible species
without the matter of the sensible object or the matter of the medium.
With his explanation of the special type of existence the sensibles have
in their media, he has already detached the sensible for.m from its matter.

It is no longer a form informing matter---at least it is not a
form only informing ma.tter. 46 It has a "spiritual" existence of some
sort. 47

Since it is already thus detached from matter it is not re-

ceived into the sense organ as whiteness is taken in by a wall.

The

sensible comes in according to the new mode of being, one connected
48
especially and specifically with the cognitive function.
Just how
we can better explain this I do not know.

We know that 1he form is

still under the conditions of matter so it is singular and not univer•
sa1. 49 We can hardly give a fuller explanation.
When asked how material bodies had the power to effect this unusual change in the medium and the organ, st. Albert brushed the question aside as irrelevant, comparing it to o~e•s asking why light shines.50
46 cf. supra P• 34 n.37 and n.43 on ta.-~r~Ee·
47 We use spiritual here in the sense that Albert notes it in his Summa
de Creaturis II, q.21, a.5 (Vives XXXV, 209), " ••• non vocat esse
spirituale a spiritu qui est anima sed a spiritu qui est corpus."
48 II de An· t. 4, c.l (Vives, V, 293-294), • ••• sequitur quod primum
sentiens cum est in actu, est tale quale quidem ipsum sensibile:
sed alterum est esse ejus hinc et inde secundum quod est in esse
intentionali actus sensus."
49 ~., "Primum autem quod communiter convenit omni sensui secundum
quod est sensus, est quod omnis est in gradu illo apprehensionis
quod accipit speciem sensibilem sine materia, materia tamen praesente."
50- ibid., t.3, c.6 (Vives V, 241)

37

••• concedendum esse videtur, quod aliquando
at in quibusdam sensibus qui scilicet sunt
per medium extrinsecum, sensibile secundum
aliui esse est in re sensata, et secundum
aliud esse in medio et organoa sed hoc ease
in nullis pluribus sensibus est unius rationis. Et si quaeritur quid conferat ei hoc
esset videtur mihi stulta quaestio, quia nos
super-ius ostendimus omnem virtutem activam
esse per se perfectam ad agendum, sine aliquo motivo extrinseco1 et ideo dico quod
forma sensati per seipsam generat se in
medio sensus secundum esse sensibile, cuius
necessaria demonstratio est, quod ab omnibus Philosophis et ab ipsa veritate convincitur, per se sensibile esse, .quod in
secundo modo dicendi per essentiam suam est
causa sui esse sensibilisa et ideo frustra
quaeritur quid conferat ei illudt sicut si
quaeritur quid conferat luci lucere secundum actumt
Albert makes it clear that the medium and the i'aculty must be so
constructed that they can receive the forms of sensible objects because act and potency are correlative. The act can always actuate but
it can actuate only such things as are made to receive the act.
Albert's words •

51
••• sicut saepe diximus, non quaelibet passiva
vel passibilia recipiunt actus activorum quorumlibeta sed actus sensibilium recipiunt quaedam
passiva secundum quod harmonica sunt sensitiva
eorum •

••• notandum ergo ad hoc quod aliquid sit sensibile per se et proprius ••• exiguntur ••• quod
substantia sensus illius organi aptanata sit
pati ab illo et non ab alio1 sicut visus
colorum est, quem non contingit sentire per
51 ~., t.4, c.2 (Vives v, 294-295)
52 £• de Creat. II, q.34, a.2 (Vives XXXV, 299)

In
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se a\ulitu vel olf"aetu vel aliquo sensu •••
This correlation of potency and act is the final answer which St. Albert
gives when asked bar sensation is possible.
St. Albert does not seem to have thought that sensation took
place in the end organs of the various senses.

Rather he localized

the faculties in various parts of the brain and, for taste and touch,
near the heart as well as in the brain.

The act of seeing, for example,

is completed, according to Albert, in the front part of the cerebruma 53
••• virtue visiva secundum sui perfectionem
est in anteriori parte cerebri, sed secundum
progressum ad perfectionem est in nervo optico et spiritu visibili qui discurrit in
illoa et sic nihil prohibet quiD vis visiva
diversimode consider~ta diversa habet instrumenta, sicut etiam una vis visiva habet
duos oculos.
Hearing is situated in "anteriori parte medullae_ cerebr.L,;• 54 Smell is
55
rooted in the anterior of the cerebrum along with sigbt.
Taste, as
we mentioned, has a double seat, "!:!!12. modo quod est judicium saporum
•• et

~nervus

gustativus principiatur

~

cerebro ••• alio

~secundum

guod est sensus alimenti ••• ~ instrumentum circa .2.2!:" ~ 56 Touch
is similar to taste in thisa 57
CUm enim tactus sit sicut forma corporis
animati ••• percipit quidquid immutat cutem
••• quoad hoc principalitur tactus est in
corde ••• Secundum autem quod tactus est
judicium tangibilium sic principiatur ••• in
cerebro.

53

ibid.,
ibid.,
ibid.'
56 ~,
57 ~.,
54
55

II,
II,
II,
II,
II,

q.l9, a.l ad 3 (Vives XXXV, 166)
q.23 (Vives XXXV, 229)
q.2B, a.l (Vives XXXV, 256)
q.32, a.3 (Vives XXV, 279
q.33, a.3 (Vives XXXV, 289-290)
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In St. Albert's psychology of sensation the psychic element is

added to sensation when the species reach the seat of sensation.

There,

too, the sense is completely reduced to act and posits its proper operation, the perception of the sensible object:58
••• dicimus enim quod nullius sensibilis
judicium perficitur in organo proprii
sensus qui recipit illud sensibile, sed
omnes particulares nervi qui ad organa
propriorum sensuum diriguntur, •••
diriguntur ad anteriorem partem cerebri •••
Concerning the nature of the species in sensation insofar as it
is a representation, st. Albert agreed with Aristotle and held the
interpretation which st. Thomas was also to take up.

The species in

sensation is a means to the cognition of something else.

It is not,

then, that which is known but that by which something else. is known.

59

In the language of st. Thomas and later scholastics it is a medium guo

and not a medium guod. 60
The reason for this stand is similar to that proposed for the
nature of light, which we discussed earlier. 61

St. Albert declared

that light was not a body but a quality that made air and water transparent.

It was "pervium" because if it were not it would block vision

rather than help it, since it would be seen instead of the object.
So too the species must be a medium quo lest it block cognition by
becoming the thing which is perceived.

st. Albert does not give a

58 II de An, t 1 r, c.ll (Vives V, 310)
59 ~·~~·II, q.45, a.2 (Vives XXXV, 414); ef. supra p.23 n.l8
60 cf • s. Thomas, De ~ et Sensato, leet. 4
61 cf. supra PP• 32-33

,..
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thorough treatment of this problem but simply notes that the object
of vision is the colored thing (and so for the other senses) and

t~t

the species is a representation that leads to the knowledge o£ these
objects.
This description o£ St. Albert's theory of external sensation is
enough for our purpose.

From it we can see clearly enough what he con-

sidered to be the cause of cognition in external sensation.

We have

attempted to answer in the above description the question we put at
the beginning of our discussiona

"What causes sense cognition?"

Obviously, according to St. Albert, the sensible object existing
objectively in the external world is the efficient cause of the sensible species, which in turn cause sensation by reducing the faculty
i'rom potency to act.

We have seen that Albert said explicitly thata

"(visibile) speciem sui generat in medio at ~ organo ••• n6 2 And again,
" ... dicendum quod organa sensuum tantum pati et

~

agere nisi per

accidens ••• n 63 Once more, adding a bit on the. nature of the species a
"dicendum quod in veritate species sensibiles generantur in organo .!!!'.!!!!!•uet
~

haec~

species

~

de !.!!.! materiali l l naturali !:!!,

est similitudo illius generata ab i11a, et per simi1itudinem guam

habet £S!! r.! ducit in illam. u64
In this we see that the causality proceeds link by link from the
object, through the medium, to the sense organ.

This much many pre-

62 ~· ~ Creat. II, q.45, a.2 ad 2 (Vives XXXV, 415)
63 ibid. II, q.45, a.4 (Vives XXXV, 417-418)
64 ~· II, q.45, a.2 (Vives XXXV, 414)
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vious philosophers had admitted.

What they did not admit was that the

sensible species in the organ could exert any causal influence on the
faculty.

St. Albert came to this juncture and decided to follow Aris-

totle all the way.

So, leaving behind the earlier scholastics, he

admitted causality from the sense organs to the faculties.

This is

the reason why he saida "sensus completus per actum species sensitivae
,judicat et agit." 65 Again he admitted that the sense faculty is passive when he said explicitly& "se~sus est potentia passiva. •• 66 In
neither of those places does he limit the causal influence to the body.
~n

both it is simply sensusa it is not corpus or organum.
J'rom all this we can say with certainty that st. Albert did re-

establish the Aristotelian notion of causality in sensation.

For him

as for the Stagirite, the object is active, the subject passive until
informed by the sensible species.

With Aristotle, St. Albert depends

on the substantial union of matter and form to close the gap between

.

body and soul that had made other philosophers take refuge in occasionalistic theories of sensation. Albert has in very truth taken over the
whole Aristotelian structure.

All that remains for us is to compare

Albert's answer with that of St. Thomas.

Such a study will show us how

much of the complete scholastic theory we owe to St. Albert and how
much his famous pupil added to his eJp lanation.
65 ibid. II, q.34, a.l ad 2 (Vives XXXV, 296)
66 ~· II, q.34, a.l (Vives ~v, 296)

CHAPTER FOUR

EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION
In

the pr6vious chapters of this paper we have traced the devel-

opment of the scholastic theory of causality in external sensation from
Plato and Aristotle down to St. Albert the Great.

In this outline we

saw the two tendencies, Platonic and Aristotelian, each struggling to
supplant the other.

The Platonic explanation seemed to be the more

widely accepted right up to the time of St. Albert the Great.

Certain

details of the peripatetic theory were accepted, but the complete
adoption came only with st. Albert.
Now in this last chapter we shall test Albert's solution in the
light of St. Tho:uas Aquir.a.s' doctrine, and with this we can decide how
much of the complete scholastic theory Albert had.

Our task in this

is rather simple, for Albs-t' s famous pupil has taken over his master's
doctrine with hardly a change. As we might expect, Thomas is more interested in the metaphysics of sensation than in the physiology of the
process, with the result that he treats the strictly philosophical
problems more explicitly than Albert and spends little time on the
physiological side of the question.l This, however, is more a differl

The only places where St. Thomas gives any extensive treatment of
sensation are in his commentaries on Aristotle's Q! ~and De
~ !i Sensato. In his ~ Theologiea he treats sensation in
two. articles of a single question (I, q.78, a.3 and 4). In the
De Veritate there are a few passing references to sensation.
42

.------------------------------------------~!
43
ence of emphasis than anything else, so it does not deny the correctness of Albert's explanation.
It is a simple matter to show how closely st. Thomas followed
Albert since the two agree on all the main issues concerning sensation.
Eoth have the same Aristotelian foundation.

Thomas, like Albert, bases

his psychology on the classic notions of potency and act and matter and
form.

Thus the soul for the Angelic Doctor is the form of the body,

yet it is more than a mere corporeal form. 2 As such it has two sets
of capabilities, those it uses with the body and those whose operation
is independent of the body. 3 Of the former the sensitive powers are
highest and most noble; the latter are the faculties of the intellectual
part of the soul.

4

Sensation itself is for st. Thomas what it was for Albert, a mode
of cognition inferior to intellection.s It is an activity of the human
composite of body and soul.6 Thoms, more than Albert, emphasizes the
unity of the act of sensation.
2

3

4
5
6

§. !• I, q.75, a.l ad

Albert, more concerned with the physio-

4, "Humana anima non est forma in materia
corporali immersa, vel ab ea totaliter comprehensa, .propter suam
perfectionem; et ideo nihil prohibet aliquam ejus virtutem non esse
corporis actum, quamvis anima secundum suam essentiam sit corporis
formam."
ibid., corp., "Unde intantum sua virtute excedit materiam corporalem,
quod habet aliquam operationem et virtutem in qua nullo modo communicat materia corporalis, et haec virtus dicitur intellect us;"
~., q.B4, a.6, "Sed (Aristotelis) sensum posuit propriam operationem non habere sine communicatione corporis, ita quod sentire non
sit actus animae tantum, sed conjuncti."
ibid., q.77, a.4, "Secundum igitur primum potentiarum ordinem
(i.e. perfectionis) potentiae sensitivae ••• sunt priores potentiis
animae nutritivae;" for intellect cf. note 3.
cf. ~·!• I, q.78, a.3
ct. note 3

r
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logical problems of sensation, gave long explanations of the bodily
process, almost taking for granted the role of the faculty in sensation.
It is certain, however, that he did think of sensation as a unified
whole, even though he seemed to separate the parts in his discussion. 7
The sense for both is a passive potency Which has actual sensation
only when it is informed by the activity of the objects of sense. 8
These objects are actually sensible, that is, they are able of

the~

selves to reduce the sense from potency to act. 9 This reduction takes
place through the reception of the sensible form in a passive way. 10
Still the faculty is not completely passive for Thomas any more than
it

was

for his teacher.

Both agreed that the sense, once informed,

posite its proper operation, the judicium sensus. 11
Thomas like Albert held five external sensesa sight, hearing,
smell, taste, and touch.12 The objects of these senses are physically
existing bodies possessed of full reality apart from the subject of
7 this is clear from Albert's description of sense as "potentia passiva
••• {quae) transmutatur in speciem sensibilem secundum intentionem •••
quando vero habet speciem sensibilem, tunc est potentia completa
per actum." (§. ~ ~· II, q.34, a.l, Vives XXXV, 295-296)
8 For Albert of. supra P• 20 n. 9; for Thomas c£. s. T. I, q.ss, a.l
ad 2, " ••• sensus in actu est sensibile in actu, ••• non ita quod ipsa
vis sensitive. sit ipsa similitude sensibilia quae est in sensu, sed
quia ex utroque fit unum, sicut ex actu et potentia."
9 2• l• I, q.79, a.3 ad 1, " ••• sensibilia inveniuntur actu extra
animam."
10 Quodlib. Vii, a.3, "Sensus autem exteriores suscipiunt tantum a rebus per modum patiendi sine hoc aliquid cooperantur, ad sui formationem."
11 ~., " ••• (sensus) iam formati habeant proprium operationem quae
est judicium de propriis obiectis."
12 §• I• I, q.78, a.3
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sensation.

13

He, no less than Albert, gave the exterior world full

objective existence.

Thus the object of sight is the visible object

existing apart from the sense; the subject of hearing is sound, and so
on for the other senses.l4
St. Thomas agrees with his teacher that all of these objects of
sense cannot act directly upon the senses.

Some must act through
special media, while others can directly i:I.H'ect the sense organs. 15
Three senses must act through external media.

Of these sight can be

caused only when color acts through the medium off air or water.

These

are media, however only in so far as they are transparent or "diaphanous".
Hearing also takes place through an external medium, or rather either of
two exteriDr media, air or water.
13

Smell is the third sense that operates

I, q.85, a.l, "Quaedam virtua cognoscitiva est actus organi
corporalis, scilicet sensus; et ideo objectum cujuslibet sensitivae
po,en~iae est forma, prout in materia corporali existit."
14 II !! An., lect. 14, " ••• visibi1e est color;" ~., lect. 16,
" ••• determinat de audibili ••• id est de sono;" ibid., lect. 19,
• ••• non ita bene determinari potest de odore ••• SICUt de praedictis
sensibilibus;" ~., lect. 20, " ••• ostendit quod ••• sapor, qui est
gustabile ••• ;" ibid., • ••• tangibili, quod est objectum tactus ••• "
15 In one place in his commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle Thomas
succinctly states his own position concerning media in sensation,
(II~ .An., lect. 15), "Oatendit quid sit medium in his sensibus;
et dicit quod illud quod movetur a sono est aer; medium quod movetur ab odore, est aliquid commune aeri et aquae, et sicut utrumque
eorum est medium quod movetur a colore; sed a colore movetur utr~
que horum, secundum quod diaphanum." Although Thomas does not mention water as a medium for sound in this lectio, he does so a few
pages later, (!lli•• lect. 17), " ••• audimus in aere et in aqua."
~.,
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through an external medium.

It, like sound, takes place with either

air or water to carry the sensible forms to its organ.

Thomas says

that touch and taste use internal, but no external media.l6

This

agrees with Albert's opinion as we noted above.l7
Sense cognition for St. Thomas was a process of assimilation of subject to object.

This is clear from his famous dictuma sensus

!!!

actu

est sensibile ~ actu. 18 By this, however, he did not mean that the
sense became physically identical with its object.

This assimilation

i'or Thomas as for Albert took place through a species or image. 19 The
object causes a representation {similitudo) of itself in the sense,
directly or mediately, and by this causes perception of itself. 20
St. Thomas also called this an intentional union or one ger modum

~

tentionis,21 which are simply different expressions to explain the
peculiar union necessary for cognition.

This is exactly the position

held by St. Albert, and it is expressed in practically the same terms. 22
16 De Sensu !1 Sensato, lect. 14, " ••• duo {sensus) ••• sentiunt suum
sensibile conjunctum non per medium extraneum, scilicet tactus
et gustus."
17 cf. supra PP• 32-34
18 2• !• I, q.55, a.l ad 2
19 Q! ~ et Sensato, lect. 2, "Quid autem sit sensus ••• ostendit •••
per hoc scilicet quod animalia recipere possunt species sensibilium."
20 g ~ An., lect. 13, " ••• substantia uniusquisque sensus et eius
definitio est in hoc quod est aptum natum pati a tali sensibili •••
Ipsae enim species activorum in sensu actu sunt sensibilia propria."
21 IV Sent., dist.44, q.3, a.l, sol. 3, "Alio modo aliquid recipitur
in altero spiritualiter per modum intentionis cuiusdam sicut similitudo albedinis recipitur in aere et in pupilla ••• "
22 cf. supra P• 23
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The species by which this union takes place are the accidental
forms of sensible objects according to a special type of existence.
They are not forms with natural physical existence but forms with
23
what st. Thomas called !!.!.! spirituale.
This we saw was Albert• s
term for the mode of existence of sensible form in the sense faculty.

24

But while Albert restricts this mode of existence (at least by definition)
to forms in the faculty, Thomas uses it for the non-physical existence
of forms in media and sense.25

This, however, is of minor importance

because Albert gives no definition of !!!! sensibile and !!!! spirituale
that really distinguishes the two.

Both are types of

ll!.Y!!, and as such, Thomas equates them calling both

~

~

repreaenta-

spiritua.le.

This !!!! spirituale is effected, according to St. Thomas, by a
"spiritual change" which is the specific activity of the object in
sensation.26 Natural change---the physical assimilation of organ or
medium to the sensible object---may or may not accompany sensation,
but there must always be the spiritual change if there is to be actual
23

II de£:!!., lect. 24, " ••• (forma) in re sensibili hs.bet esse naturale,
in sensu autem habet esse intentionale et spirituale."
24 c£. supra PP• 22-23
25 cf. supra P• 46, nn. 21 and 23
26 ~· ~· I, q.78 a.3, "Est autem duplex immutatio; una naturalis, et
alia spiritualis. Naturalis quidem secundum quod forma immutantis
recipitur in immutato secundum esse naturale; sicut calor in calefactoa spiritualis autem, secundum quod forrra immutantis recipitur
in immutato secundum esse spirituale, ut forma coloris in pupilla,
quae non fit per hoc colorata. Ad operationem autem sensus.requiritur immutatio spiritualis, per quam intentio formae sensibilia
fiat in organo sensus."
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sensation.

If this were not so all bodies would have sensation every

time they were physically altered.

For example, a stone becoming

warm would sense Vlarmth. 27 According to St. Thomas this immutatio
spiritualis takes place in the medium and in the sense in some cases,
and only in the sense in others.

In sight, for instance, there is
. sp1r1
. "tual change 1n
. th e sense an d 1n
. the me d"1um. 28 The same is
th1s
true for smell. 29 Actual sound is not a quality of bodies but of air,
so it exists physically in air and has the immutatio spiritualis only
in the sense. 30 Taste and touch have no external medium so the ~
mutatio spiritualis can be

~nly

in the sense.

There is however a

natural change in the sense organs of these two senses besides the
"spiritual" change, since the hand touching something warm itself
becomes warm and the tongue becomes moist from the moist taste. 31
On this matter of spiritual change in sensation there is general
27
28
29
30
31

ibid., " ••• alioquin si sola immutatio naturalis sufficeret ad
'58ntiendum, omnia corpora natui-alia sentirent dum alterantur."
!! de An., lect. 20, " ••• immutatur medium spiritualiter {in olfactu) ••• Quod autem spiritualis immutatio fit a visibili magis quam
ab alii• ltDsibus ••• "
ibid.
ibid., lect. 16, "Nam in corpore sonante non est sonus, nisi in potentia. In medio autem quod movetur ex percussione corporis sonantis, fit sonus in actu."
§.•I• I, q.78, a.3, ''Ex parte autem organi est immutatio naturalis
in tactu et gustu; nam et manus tangens calida calefit, et lingua
humectatur per humiditatem saporis." He explains this last, ~·
ad 4, "Nam tactus immutatur naturali immutatione, et non solUm
spirituali, quantum ad organum suum secundum qualitatem quae ei
proprie objicietur; gustus autem organum non immutatur de necessitate naturali immutatione secundum qualitatem quae ei proprie ei
objicitur {ut scilicet lingua fiat dulcis, vel amara), sed secundum
praeambulem qualitatem in qua fundatur sapor; scilicet secundum
humorem, qui est objectum tactus."
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agreement bitween Albert and Thomas with some little
one or two minor points.

disagre~ent

on

When Thomas speaks of immutatio spiritualis

in the media of sight and smell, he is saying in different words
What we heard Albert say above, when he stated that colors and odors
were in the air and water as in media.

This mode of existence he con-

trasted to natural existence as in a ~ubject. 32 The sensibles of
touch
/

and

taste are in their internal medium naturaliter and spiritu-

aliter for Thomas and as in a medium and as in a subject for Albert,
so both agree on this.

Albert and Thomas differ on sound.

Thomas,

as we have noted, says that is is in air only as in its subject, according to !!!! naturale, whereas Albert says it has the spiritual existence as well and is in the medium as in its subject and as in a
medium.

This is of minor importance, but it is a point of definite

disagreement.
Since Thomas holds a species theory of sense cognition, it is
natural that he says that the forms of sensible objects are received
by the senses without their matter. 33 On this he and Albert follow
Aristotle.34 All three hold that the species in cognition are forms
abstracted from the matter of sensible objects but received into the
sense organs under the conditions of matter.
cf. supra P• 35
~ ~., lect. 24, "Sensus est susceptivus formarum sine
materia, sicut cera recipit signum annuli, sine ferro et auro;"
and 2• !• I, q.84, a.2, " ••• sed cum materialibus conditionibus."
34 cf. sspra P• 7
32
33

!!

50

For Thomas the species in sense cognition are, as we mentioned
in our last chapter, the medium quo !!! cognoscitur, not the medium
•t Ure 35

d

~ COgnOSC~

This means that the species are not perceived in

sensation but lead directly to a perception of the object they represent.

Albert holds the same position on the nature of the species.36
Thus far there has been almost complete agreement; the only con-

flict was on one minor point of the nature of the existence of sound
in its medium.
treat.

A

There are a few similar points which we shall now

typical instance, though obviously not important, is the

emendation St. Thomas makes of St. Albert's statement tlw.t colors are
only potentially in the medium between the object and the eye.3 7
Thomas must have noticed that color only potentiallz in the diaphanous
medium could never actuate the species of color in the eye.

He did,

likeWise, realize with Albert that the color was not there in its
physical actuality, for if it were the medium it would impede rather
than help vision.

Still the Angelic Doctor has no real answer for the

difficulty so he merely tones down Albert' s"potentiallf to thisa "• ••
iste modus essendi propter

imperfectionem appropinguat ad modum
guo aliguid est in aliguo in potentia." 38 The other points of differ~

erence, such as the classification of the internal senses, on which
cf. supra P• 39
ibid.
~· de Creat. II, q.34, a.2 (Vives XXXV, 30+), " ••• sensibile in
medio sicut in medio, non est nisi secundum potentiam et viam et
transitum.
38 ~ Sensu et .sensato, lect. 5
35

36
37
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Albert followed the Arabians and Thomas followed Aristotle, need not
concern us here since they are beyond the scope of our investigation
. ext ernal. sensat•1on. 39
of caus al 1•t y 1n

Suffice it to repeat that there

are no major dieagreements; besides on the particular issue that concerns us, causality in external sensation, the two are in perfect
agreement. 40
With this we conclude our treatment of St. Albert's contribution
to the scholastic theory of external sensation.

To summarize our

findings briefly, we can say that although St. Albert did not completely free himself from the influence of Plato and Augustine, nonetheless on the question of our study he followed Aristotle faithfully.
He clung to the Aristotelian basis of the solution and followed the
Stagirite throughout this explanation.
It is good for us to look on St. Thomas• synthesis as the crown
of medieval philosophy, but we should not forget that many of' the
jew6ls of that crown were borrowed from St. Albert the Great.

Albert,

it is true, was never the philosophical goldsmith to cast such a crown;
he did however, cut the brilliant facets on several of its largest gems.
One of the jewels of this diadem whose sparkling radiance is the product of nbert' s handiwork is the scholastic theory of causality in extarnal sensation. Let us give St. Albert full credit for this masterly
work.
39 For a treatment of these differences see Reilly, 20-30
cf. supra P• 44

40
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